Abstract. In recent years the amount of digital data in the world has risen immensely. But, the more information exists, the greater is the possibility of its unwanted disclosure. Thus, the data privacy protection has become a pressing problem of the present time. The task of individual privacy-preserving is being thoroughly studied nowadays. At the same time, the problem of statistical disclosure control for collective (or group) data is still open. In this paper we propose an effective and relatively simple (wavelet-based) way to provide group anonymity in collective data. We also provide a real-life example to illustrate the method.
Introduction
Year by year more and more data emerge in the world. According to the latest IDC research [1] , the Dig ital Universe will double every 18 months, and the number of "security-intensive" information will grow fro m 30% to roughly 45% by the end of 2012. This means that the risk of privacy violation and confidential data disclosure rises dramatically. The threat doesn't only comprise the possibility of stealing a credit card and social security numbers, patient medical records and images, Internet commerce and other transaction data. It is popular nowadays to provide direct access to the depersonalized and non-aggregated primary data. E.g., one can easily gain access to the microfile data in census statistics and sociology. But, if these data aren't protected, individual anonymity can easily be violated. That has been clearly shown by Sweeney [2, p. 21] . Using Massachusetts voters data, she proved that knowing a person' s birth date and full 9-d igit ZIP code is enough to identify 97% of voters.
A problem of indiv idual anonymity in primary data isn't a new one. It is being more or less successfully solved as one of the main tasks in privacy-preserving data mining. There are different statistical disclosure control methods [3] which guarantee:
-k-anonymity [4] . Th is means every attribute values combination corresponds to at least k respondents existing in the dataset sharing the combination;
-even more delicate l-d iversity [5] and t-closeness [6] .
At the same time a problem of providing group (collective) anonymity is still open [7] . By group anonymity we understand protecting such data features that can't be distinguished by considering individual records only. E.g., we cannot protect the regional distribution of young unemployed females in terms of inid ividual anonymity.
Either individual or group anonymity can be provided by introducing an acceptable level of uncertainty to the primary data. By making specific data records impossible to distinguish among the others, we guarantee required privacy-preserving.
When providing data anonymity, both group and individual, it is important to take into account the adversarial model which reflects what information is known to an adversary, and what is not.
In our work, we suppose that the potential adversary doesn't possess any other additional info rmation except for the one contained in the primary data.
In general, there exist a variety of approaches to solving the group anonymity problem. In this paper, we will discuss a so-called extremu m transition approach. Its main idea is to swap records with specific attribute values between the positions of their ext reme concentrations and the other permitted ones.
Depending on the task definit ion, we can imp le ment this approach by: -swapping values of required attributes between respondents; -transferring a respondent to be protected to the other place of liv ing (to the other place of work). In most cases it is natural to transfer not only a single respondent, but the whole respondent' s family as well;
-mere modifying the attribute values. Of course, it's easy to provide group anonymity. A ll we need is a permission to move respondents between any possible places (as long as the population number on a particular territory remains stable). But such primary data deformation almost inevitably leads to considerable utility loss. Imagine that we want to transfer some respondents to a particular territory. But, there are not enough people of the same sex and age to fit our new " migrants". Obviously, such a transfer cannot be acceptable.
All this leads to a question. If we know what to modify to provide data group anonymity, what should we preserve to prevent data utility loss?
In general, it is possible to preserve absolute quantities only for a particular population category (all the population provided, respondents with required values of a certain attribute etc.). But, in many cases researches can be interested in the relative values rather than in the absolute ones. Let us consider some typical examp les.
1. True quantity of military (or special service) officers can be absolutely confidential. Th is is also the case for their regional d istribution. At the same time, informat ion on their distribution by age, marital status or, say, wife's occupation can be very interesting and useful for sociologists.
2. In developing countries, there is usually no public statistics on a company' s income. In this case, information on the company's income growth rates can serve as an important marker of its economic status and development prospective.
We come to conclusion that we need to preserve relations between strata, distribution levels, data ranges rather than the absolute values. But, it's not easy to alter data records with a particular attribute values combination and preserve proportional relat ions between all the other possible ones. Such a problem seems to be as complex as the k-anonymization problem. The latter, as stated in [8] , is an NP-hard problem.
Certainly, there are different techniques that can aid in finding a balance between altering primary data and preventing utility loss. For instance, we can try to perform such data swapping that main statistical features such as data mean value and their standard deviation will persist. For example, in [11] , a specific normalizing process to preserve these features is introduced.
But, in the current paper we propose to use wavelet transform (WT) instead. Surely, WT doesn't guarantee the persistance of all statistical data features (except for their mean value which will be discussed later in the paper), but it can preserve some informat ion that can come in handy for specific studies.
Generally speaking, WT is an effective way to present a square-integrable signal by a basis obtained from certain wavelet and scaling functions providing its both time and frequency representation. We consider WT to be acceptable because:
-It splits primary data into approximation and multilevel details. To protect data, we can redistribute approximation values considering particular attribute values combinations. Besides, we can prevent utility loss by leaving details unchanged (or by altering them proportionally). In this case, proportional relations between different attribute values ranges will be preserved. To illustrate that, let's refer to [9] . In Russia, studying the responses to 44 public opin ion polls (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) showed the following result. It turned out that details reflect hidden time series features which come in handy for near-term and mediu m-term social processes forecasting.
-We can use the fast Mallat's pyramid algorithm [10] . Its runtime co mplexity is O(n), where n is the maximu m wavelet decomposition level.
-WT is already being successfully and intensively used to provide individual anonymity [11] .
Thereby, in this work we set and solve a following task. We want to provide group anonymity for depersonalized respondent data according to particular attribute combination. We propose to complete this task using WT. In this case, group anonymity is gained through redistributing wavelet approximat ion values. Fixing data mean value and leaving wavelet details unchanged (or proportionally altering them) preserves data features which might become useful for specific researches.
Figuratively speaking, we change the relief (appro ximat ion) of a restricted area, but try to preserve local data distribution (details).
We would also like to admit that there is no feasible algorithm to restore primary data after modify ing them using the proposed method.
Theoretic Background

General Group Anonymity Definiti ons
Let the micro file data be presented as Our task is to protect some of the vital value combinations. E.g., if we took "Age" and "Employ ment status" as vital attributes we could possibly be interested in providing anonymity for the vital value co mb ination ("Middle-aged"; "Unemployed").
We will also denote by p S a subset of microfile data elements corresponding to
called parameter values, whereas th p attribute will be called a parameter attribute because it will be used for div iding microfile data into groups to be analyzed.
For examp le, if we took "Place of living" as a parameter attribute we could obtain groups of "Urban" and "Rural" residents.
After having defined both parameter and vital attributes and values, we need to calculate the quantities of respondents that correspond to a specific pair of a vital value comb ination and a parameter value These quantities can be gathered into an array 1 2 ( , ,..., ) m= which we will call a quantity signal.
To provide group anonymity for the microfile we need to replace this quantity signal with another one:
Also, we need to preserve specific data features.
First of all, we need to make sure that the overall number of records remains stable:
And, as it was mentioned in Section 1, we also need to preserve all the wavelet decomposition details of signal q up to some level k (or at least alter them proportionally). Possible solution to the task is proposed in the following subsections.
General Wavelet Transform Definitions
In this subsection we will revise the WT basics which are necessary for the further explanation. For detailed information see [10] . Let us call an array 
In (1), a convolution (which is denoted by * ) of s and l is taken, and then the result is being dyadically downsampled (denoted by 2n ↓ ). Also, 1 a is an array of approximation coefficients, whereas 1 d is an array of detail coefficients. To obtain approximation and detail coefficients at level k , we need to perform (1) on approximation coefficients at level 1 k − : 
... ; ... )
We can always present an initial signal s as 
Here, k A is called an appro ximation at level k , and i D is called a detail at level i . Approximation and details fro m (3) can be presented as follows:
In (4), k a and k d are being dyadically upsampled (which is denoted by 2n ↑ ) first, and then convoluted with the appropriate wavelet filter. As we can see, all k A elements depend on the k a coefficients. According to Section 1, we need to somehow modify the approximat ion, and at the same time p reserve the details. As it follows fro m (4), details do not depend on approximation coefficients. Thus, preserving detail coefficients preserves the details.
Respectively, to modify the approximat ion we have to modify corresponding approximation coefficients.
Obtaining New Approxi mation Using Wavelet Reconstruction Matrices
In [12] , it is shown that WT can be performed using matrix mu ltip licat ions. In particular, we can always construct a matrix such that Another problem arises. The mean value of the resultant signal q will obviously differ fro m the initial one. To overcome this problem, we need to mult iply it by such a coefficient that the result has the required mean value. Due to the algebraic properties of convolution, both resultant details' and approximat ion' absolute values will differ fro m the init ial ones by that precise coefficient. This means that the details will be changed proportionally which totally suits our problem statement requirements. In result, we obtain our required signal q  .
To illustrate this method we will consider a practical example.
Experime ntal Results
To show the method under review in action, we took the 5-Percent Public Use Microdata Samp le Files fro m U.S. Census Bureau [13] corresponding to the 2000 U.S. Census microfile data on the state of California.
The micro file provides various information on more than 1,6 million respondents. We took a "Military service" attribute as a vital one. This attribute is a categorical one. Its values are integers fro m 0 to 4. For simp licity, we took one vital value combination consisting of only one vital value, i.e. "1". It stands for "Active duty".
We also took "Place of Work Super-PUMA" as a parameter attribute. This attribute is also a categorical one. Its values stand for different statistical area codes.
For our examp le, we decided to take the following attribute values as parameter ones: 06010, 06020, 06030, 06040, 06060, 06070, 06080, 06090, 06130, 06170, 06200, 06220, 06230, 06409, 06600 and 06700. These codes correspond to border, coastal and island statistical areas.
By choosing these exact attributes we actually set a task of protecting information on military officers' number distribution over particular Californian statistical areas.
According to Section 2, we need to construct an appropriate quantity signal. The simp lest way to do that is to count respondents with appropriate pair of a vital value combination and a parameter value. The results are shown in Table 2 (the third row).
Let's use the second order Daubechies low-pass wavelet filter
to perform two-level wavelet deco mposition (2) of a corresponding quantity signal (all the calculations were carried out with 12 decimal numbers, but we will present all the numeric data with 3 decimal nu mbers):
( (1), (2), (3), (4) 
According to (5), we obtain a signal appro ximation: As we can see, according to the extremu m transition approach, we have to lower the military men quantity in the 06700 area. At the same time, we have to raise appropriate quantities in some other areas. The particular choice either may depend on any additional goals to achieve or it can be absolutely arbitrary.
But, along with this, we have to avoid incidental raising of the other signal elements. We can achieve this by using appropriate constraints. Also, it is necessary to note down that there can possibly be some signal elements which do not play important role, i.e. we can change them without any restrictions.
To show how to formally express suitable constraints, we decided to raise the quantities in such central-part signal elements like 06070, 06080, 06090, 06130, 06170 and 06200; besides, we have chosen the first and the last three signal elements to lower their values.
Considering these requirements, we get the fo llo wing constraints: Here, all the signal samples are non-negative. Therefore, the only requirement not fulfilled yet is the equality of corresponding mean values. To provide that, we need to mu ltip ly q by the coefficient 16 16
The resultant signal has the same mean value and wavelet decomposition details as the initial one. This can be checked-up through easy but rather cumbersome calculations.
Since quantities can be only integers, we need to round the signal. Finally, we get the required quantity signal q  (see Table 2 , the fourth row).
As we can see, the masked data are completely different fro m the primary ones, though both mean value and wavelet deco mposition details are preserved.
To finish the task, we need to compile a new microfile. It is always possible to do as long as there are enough records to modify vital values of. Anyway, we can always demand this when build ing-up linear programming problem constraints. 
Conclusion and Future Research
In the paper, we have set the task of providing group anonymity as a task of protecting such collective data patterns that cannot be retrieved by analyzing individual information only. We have proposed a wavelet-based method which aims at preserving the data wavelet details as a source of information on the data patterns and relations between their components with different frequencies, along with the data mean value. At the same time, the method actually provides group anonymity since an appropriate level of uncertainty is being introduced into the data (by modifying the wavelet approximation).
The method is relatively easy and can be imp lemented programatically. Also, the method is rather flexible and can yield various resultant data sets depending on the particular task definit ion. Moreover, it can be comb ined with any existing individual anonymity methods to gain the most efficiently protected datasets.
On the other hand, the method isn't acceptable in various cases because it doesn't guarantee that some statistical data features, such as standard deviation, persist.
In the paper, we only pointed out the problem of group anonymity. There remain many questions to answers and challenges to response. Among them we would especially like to stress on such ones: -Using different wavelet bases can lead to obtaining different data sets.
-Modifying quantity signals isn't very useful for different real-life examp les. In situations like protecting the regional distribution of middle-aged people the relative data such as ratios seem to be more important to protect.
